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Scott Lawson
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Cursor Traces Its Marketplace Breach to Exposed Agent Traces and a Vendor Key

Cursor has published the findings of a two-week investigation into the security incident it first disclosed on October 29, and the chain it describes starts well outside its own marketplace. In an update dated November 13, the company says an attacker obtained an access key that Cursor had issued to Fireworks, a third-party vendor it used for model training and inference, and that the key was exposed by Fireworks.

With that key, the attacker copied data from a read-only storage bucket that Cursor used to share data with the vendor. The bucket held limited coding agent traces, mostly from 2025, from sessions that were not in Privacy Mode and that Cursor was permitted to use for model training. A small number of those traces contained credentials that had not been redacted. Cursor says less than 0.01 percent of customers had API credentials exposed, and coding agent traces were exposed for fewer than 0.05 percent of users who were not using Privacy Mode.

Starting with credentials found in the traces, the attacker reached select software tools used by Cursor. From those tools, the attacker accessed select archived non-production source code repositories, limited customer support data and email conversations, product usage metrics and contact details, summaries of some coding agent conversations, and some credentials that users had sent to the Cursor support team. Cursor says it has contacted each affected customer directly.

The most visible step came on October 29. Using a stolen credential from the exposed internal data, the attacker placed malicious, unauthorized copies of Anthropic's Claude Code extension directly on the cache used to serve the Cursor VS Code extension marketplace. Cursor stresses that Anthropic did not publish the copy, that the incident was not a vulnerability in Anthropic's product, and that the marketplace source, Open VSX, never had the malware. At most 5,000 users who requested specific cached versions that day potentially received the malicious build, which was available for about 11 hours before it was removed. The tampered versions were 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, and Cursor warns that uninstalling the extension alone may not be enough for anyone who installed them.

Cursor says the incident is now contained, with the last attacker activity it has seen dated November 1 and blocked. It moved all inference traffic away from Fireworks, deactivated the vendor key, rotated every exposed credential and, as a precaution, all credentials in use across its internal systems, rebuilt its extension marketplace, added secret scanning, expanded network restrictions, redeployed production infrastructure, and engaged external forensics experts.

The company also lists what was not affected: prompts and code from Privacy Mode users, live traffic, production systems, the Cursor app and its official updates, release signing keys, customer code repositories, and any other extension in its marketplace. The broader lesson is hard to miss. Agent traces are detailed records of real work, and when they still hold live credentials, storing and sharing them becomes part of a product's security surface, not just its training pipeline.

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